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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JO ELLEN RAY, fna JO ELLEN 
THOMAS, and STATE OF UTAH 
by and through Utah State 
Dept. of Social Services, 
• . 
. 
. 
EDWARD THOMAS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
• 
• 
. 
. Case No. 
Defendant-Appellant. 
. 
. 
• . 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
• 
This is an Appeal from a Judgment of the Second 
Judicial District Court for Weber County, Honorable Calvin J. Gould, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court granted Judgment in favor of the 
State of Utah, Department of Social Services, in the amount of 
Three Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy Five Dollars ($3975.00) repre-
senting reimbursement for Welfare payments made for the benefit of 
Appellant's dependent minor children in the custody of his ex-wife. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests this Court to overrule or reverse 
the decision of the District Court and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case is before this Court pursuant to Rule 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
73(o) on an "Agreed Statement of Record on Appeal". The facts 
provided here will be referenced to the paragraphs of that State- ~: 
ment. 
Appellant was required, by a Decree of Divorce en-
.. 
,•' 
tered February 8, 197 4, to pay child support in the amount of Fifty·~: 
Dollars ($50.00) per month for each of the the two children. (Para-
• 
graphs 1 and 2.) On June 22, 1976, at a Show Cause hearing instit-
uted by the State of Utah concerning arrearages, the prior Decree ... 
was modified to require the child support payments to be made 
through the Clerk of the Court. (Paragraphs 3-5.) 
After making one such payment to the Clerk of the 
Court, Appellant testified below that he made each and every sub-
sequent payment directly to his ex-wife at her specific request. 
(Paragraphs 12-1~.) 
Appellant's ex-wife, while admitting to receiving 
certain payments personally, was unaware as to the amount or fre-
quency of the payments, and whether or not they coincided with 
the periods during which she was receiving Public Assistance. 
(Paragraphs 16 and 17.) The ex-wife further denied that.all pay-
rnents had been properly made. (Paragraph 17.) 
Intermittently from June, 1976, through December, 
1981, Appellant's ex-wife was receiving Welfare benefits for the 
minor children, the total of which, less the proper deductions, 
was Three Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy Five Dollars ($3975.00) 
at the time of the hearing below~ (Paragraphs 7, 10, and 11.) 
.. 
... 
..... 
... , 
':1 
..• 
.. 
.... 
'• ·-.~ 
~l 
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Ruling that oral testimony was insufficient to establish payment 
which was required to be made through the Clerk of the Court, the 
District Court granted Judgment in the full amount of Three Thou-
sand Nine Hundred Seventy Five Dollars ($3975.00). (Paragraph 18.) 
This Appeal resulted from that Judgment. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether oral testimony of the support obliger, if 
believed, is sufficient to establish payment under a support order 
requiring payment through the Clerk of the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
ORAL TESTIMONY IS SUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH PAYMENT. 
It should be first be noted that the Trial Court 
did not rule as to whether the payments had actually been made. 
That is, whether Appellant or his ex-wife were telling the truth 
-
about the payments. The Court instead ruled that Appellant's 
oral testimony was entitled to no weiaht whatsoever. It is that 
ruling, and not the issue of payment itself which is the subject 
of this Appeal. 
Appellant's research has failed to find any case 
in this State which would even remotely be classified as on-
point. Indeed, a search of other States and authorities also 
failed to disclose a case on-ooint. Accordingly, the balance 
of this Brief will be lonq on argument ~nd short on authority. 
Utah has adopted by Statute the rule that all 
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persons are competent to be witnesses so long as they are cap-
able of perceiving events and relating these perceptions. ~ 78-
24-1, Utah Code Annotated. All other factors, such as their 
interest in the litigation and their past background, are mere-
ly factors going to the weight and credibility of the testimony. 
A logical ~oncomitant of being a competent wit-
ness is having your testimony at least be considered for deter-
mining whether it is believable or not. To prima facia ignore 
a person's oral testimony is tantamount to holdinq that person 
incompetent to be a witness. This, the Statutes forbid. 
There is no Statute or Rule in this State which 
requires written, corroboration of any asserted facts. Further, 
Trial Judges of this State uniformly give jury instructions to 
the effect that the testimony of one witness, if believed, is 
sufficient to establish the proof of any fact. as against the 
contradictory testimony of other, and more numerous, witnesses. 
See California Jury Instructions - Civil "BAJI" 2.01. 
The District Court below requested memoranda from 
the oarties on this specific issue. The State of Utah, R~spondent 
here, presented and discussed four prior cases of this Court. 
Though Appellant believes these cases provide little, if any, 
guidance they will be discussed below. 
In Openshaw v .. Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 42 P. 2d 
191 (1935), the Court considered various allegations of the De-
fendant that he had made required alimony payments. This court 
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held that he would not be given credit because the amount of the 
payments was uncertain and more in the nature of child support 
rather than alimony. Such is not the case here. Appellant's tes-
timony below was certain and definite that he made all required 
child support payments in cash. 
Eiqht years later this Court considered the Openshaw 
divorce for the fourth time. Ooenshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 
144 P. 2d 528 (1943). The Defendant was aqain seeking credit for 
alimony payments and had gone so far as to fraudulently endorse and 
alter various checks and endorsements in an attempt to establish 
payment. Despite this fraud on court, this Court aareed that he 
should be given credit for all the payments he testified to except 
those backed up with fraudulent instruments. In the instant case, 
there is no allegation of fraud against Appellant. Appellant simply 
states that at his ex-wife's request, all payments were made in cash. 
In Marks v. Marks, 98 Utah 400, 100 P. 2d 207 (1940), 
this Court reversed the Trial Court holding that the burden of proof 
was on the party alleginq payment. The Court, however, did allow 
the ex-husband credit for cash payments which were admitted by his 
former wife. In the instant case, Appellant's ex-wife similarly 
admits to receiving some cash payments but is uncertain of the a-
mount and their coincidence with Welfare. 
Three years ago, this Court considered Ross v. Ross, 
592 P. 2d 600 (Utah 1979). Ross, in the context of the instant 
case merely holds that expenditures of a nature and type not in 
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conformity with the terms of the Divorce Decree are not to be 
credited against the obligations of the Decree. Such is not the 
case presently before the Court. Appellant's testimony was that 
he complied with the nature and type of the expenditures directed 
by the Decree merely avoiding the intermedial off ices of the Clerk 
of the Court. 
Appellant can find little guidance from the above-
cases concerning the facts here. The logical argument that compet-
ency to testify implies the right to have the testimony's credi-
bility weic;rhed thus remains unshaken. Accordingly, ~ 78-24-1 
establishing general competency appears to control and require 
reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
No Statute, Rule or case reauires written corrobo-
ration of support payments even thouqh such payments should have 
been made through the Clerk of the Court. Moreover, competency 
to testify necessarily carries with it the rioht to at least be 
-considered for belief. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the 
Trial Court's ruling and remand this case for consideration as to 
the testimonial veracity of the conflictina witnesses. 
'/i"""' RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~~ day of June, 1982. 
/ 
// h,..:r ~,,. ,/ 
.r // - .. 1/// G~ 
'-? ~------'•'I ?:--r C....--- ,// . I 
v -- > 
BRUCE R. BAIRD, Counsel for 
Appellant EDWARD THOMAS 
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